Revisiting Chandler on the theory of the firm by Wilson, JF & Toms, JS
This is a repository copy of Revisiting Chandler on the theory of the firm.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/79455/
Book Section:
Wilson, JF and Toms, JS (2012) Revisiting Chandler on the theory of the firm. In: Dietrich, 
M and Krafft, J, (eds.) Handbook on the economics and theory of the Firm. Edward Elgar , 
297 - 307. ISBN 978-1848446489 
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781848446489.00033
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright 
exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy 
solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The 
publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version - refer to the White 
Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, 
users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher’s website. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
 1 
 
Chandler and the Theory of the Firm 
 
 
Abstract 
The essay provides a review of Alfred Chandler's contribution to the theory of 
the firm in his three main works: Strategy and Structure (1962), The Visible 
Hand (1977) and Scale and Scope (1990). Focusing on the economic 
components of Chandler's analysis, it examines linkages to subsequent 
developments in the theory of the firm, including the resource based view. It 
discusses possible extensions of the Chandlerian perspective incorporating 
elements of capital market transaction cost theory 
 
 
 
Chandler and the Theory of the Firm 
 
Introduction 
In three influential books, Strategy and Structure (1962), The Visible Hand 
(1977) and Scale and Scope (1990), Alfred Chandler (1918-2007) made a 
seminal contribution to the development of the theory of the firm in the second 
KDOIRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\&KDQGOHU¶VWKHRU\RIWKHILUPZDVGHYHORSHGIURP
detailed empirical observation rather than formal model building and provides a 
commentary on the rise of the large managerial corporation. Although 
Chandler¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHWKHRU\RIWKHILUPLVWKHUHIRUHVRPHZKDWLPSOLFLW 
it is clear from subsequent work by a range of social scientists that he is 
regarded as one of the key 20th century influences on this and other dimensions 
of economic and management theory. A great deal of subsequent theory building 
in organisational economics, transaction cost theory, new institutional economics 
and the resource based view of the firm has accordingly acknowledged its debt 
WR &KDQGOHU¶V HDUOLHU HPSLULFDO ZRUN His theory of the firm is a theory of the 
large firm, or a theory of why large firms are successful. It is controversial, and 
implies a universally applicable model of business organisation, and as a 
consequence has attracted considerable criticism. 
 To describe these theories, accommodating this critique, and to suggest 
extensions, the chapter is structured as follows. The first section describes the 
HFRQRPLFFRPSRQHQWVRI&KDQGOHU¶VPRGHOThese components require extraction 
IURP&KDQGOHU¶VZRUNLQYLHZRIWKe strong empirical orientation of most of his 
writings. These are also characterised by inter-linkages to antecedent and 
contemporaneous theoretical developments and these are described in the 
second section. The third section offers a critique of the Chandlerian perspective 
as a whole, from a theoretical and empirical point of view. In the light of this 
critique, the fourth section briefly discusses possible extensions of the 
Chandlerian perspective incorporating elements of capital market transaction 
cost theory. A final section summarises and draws conclusions. 
 
7KHHFRQRPLFFRPSRQHQWVRI&KDQGOHU¶VPRGHO 
7KH URRWV RI &KDQGOHU¶V WKLQNLQJ OLH LQ D GHHS URRWHG DQDO\VLV RI FRUSRUDWH
America, centred on four case studies of large organisations in the inter-war 
period, typified by Du Pont (Chander, 1962). So, although µ&KDQGOHUGHYHORSHG
PRVW RI WKLV HDUO\ WKLQNLQJ LQ D WKHRUHWLFDO YDFXXP¶ (Whittington, 2008, p.xx), 
his detailed historical investigation into the responses of managers to the 
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challenges of market DQG WHFKQRORJ\ OHG JURZWK LQ $PHULFD¶V ODUJHVW ILUPV
nonetheless resulted in his influential thesis that the structure of an organisation 
is determined by its strategy towards products and markets. Accordingly the 
multi-divisional structure is a response to diversification across product and or 
geographical market.  
 &KDQGOHU¶Vconcept of the µYLVLEOHKDQG¶H[SODLQVWKHRULJLQVRIWKHILUPDQG
its subsequent growth. Firms exist because they can achieve co-ordination more 
effectively than the market so that investment in managerial hierarchy achieves 
productivity gains. Such gains are more easily realisable when the market for 
WKH ILUP¶VRXWSXWFUHDWHVVXIILFLHQWVFDOHHFRQRPLHV Some of these gains arise 
from decentralisation of decision making within the managerial hierarchy. To 
achieve them most effectively, firms adopt the multi-divisional form (Chandler, 
1962). The term M-Form is also used to describe this structure, and although 
commonly ascribed to Chandler was introduced and defined more precisely by 
Williamson (1971, p.382). According to this definition the key features are first, 
centralised control over strategic decision making investment in new products 
and markets and second, delegation of operational decision making to divisions 
monitored as profit centres. Chandler complements rather than rejects the 
conventional theory of the firm. So, on the one hand, estimation of market 
demand remains one of the key challenges facing managers of hierarchical and 
M-Form enterprises, notwithstanding their expanded scale and market 
dominance. At the same time his theory offers a detailed analysis of the 
organisation of supply.  
 Chandler also offers a theory of the growth of the firm. His ideas 
GHYHORSHGLQSDUDOOHOWRWKH5RVWRZ¶VVWDJHVWKHRU\RIHFRQRmic growth, 
which in the cold war period underpinned an alternative universalising 
alternative to Marxism. &KDQGOHU¶V ODUJH PDQDJHULDO HQWHUSULVH represents a 
progression from prior stages of less efficient forms of organisation (Whittington 
and Mayer, 2000, pp.26-27). Managers are empowered by the increasing 
complexity of the organisation and the technical content of its routines. 
Ownership is thereby divorced from control, since family and investor groups 
could not provide the managerial capacity or the technical understanding to 
exercise direct control over the management process. Much of the impetus to 
growth arises from the perpetuation of managerial hierarchies. Management 
constitute a new business class whose incentives are predicated on growth 
rather than profit and on reinvestment rather than shareholder dividends.  
 In Scale and Scope, Chandler examines the nature of such investment 
more specifically. First, investment in production facilities realises economies of 
scale and scope embedded in technological development. Second, investment in 
a marketing and distribution network delivers sales volume equivalent to the 
production capacity. Third, investment in managerial hierarchy is required in 
order to co-ordinate production and sales and to plan for future investment in 
these functional activities (Chandler, 1990, p.8). Such investments, Chandler 
argues, create first mover based competitive advantage. The American model of 
business organisation is offered as an example in contrast to the Britain, where 
such investments occurred less extensively. British relative economic decline is 
therefore often cited as proof of the Chandler hypothesis. In this sense it is 
empirically testable and has given rise to a number of studies, discussed below, 
that raise opportunities for further refinement as well as the inevitable question 
marks. 
 
Antecedent and associated economic theories 
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$VFDQEHREVHUYHGIURPWKHDERYHUHYLHZRI&KDQGOHU¶VLGHDVWKHUHDUHVRPH
REYLRXV GHEWV WR RWKHU HFRQRPLF WKHRULVWV &RDVH¶V (1937) transaction cost 
explanation of the firm as an alternative to costly market co-ordination provides 
D FRQVLVWHQW WKHRUHWLFDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU &KDQGOHU¶V PDQDJHULDO KLHUDUFK\ 
3HQURVH¶VDQDO\VLV DOVRFRQWDLQHGVLPLODUHOHPHQWVWR&KDQGOHU¶VPRGHO
linking growth, structure and the management function. She was the first to 
suggest that resources determine growth rate and profit level and limits on the 
ILUP¶VJURZWKUDWHDULVHIURPPDQDJHULDODQGFDSDFLW\FRQVWUDLQWVPenrose and 
others writing in the 1960s recognised the growing influence of managerial 
hierarchy on firm behaviour, and like Chandler, utilised objectives other than 
profit maximisation to explain firm behaviour. Baumol (1959) proposed revenue 
maximisation, Williamson (1964) managerial utility maximisation and Marris 
(1964) growth maximisation. The notion of maximisation itself was also 
challenged at around the same time by the behaviouralists, building on the work 
of Simon (1955, 1959), Cyert and March (1963) applied the theory of bounded 
rationality to explain firm behaviour, in terms of satisfactory rather than optimal 
RXWFRPHV7KHQRWLRQRI µVDWLVILFLQJ¶ LVPRUHDWWXQHGWRDPDQDJHULDO WKHRU\RI
the firm since it can more readily accommodate the multiple objective functions 
that managers in the large productive enterprise typically face. It is also more 
likely to replace profit maximisation where capital market imperfections impose 
monitoring costs on outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Taken 
together, these new economic assumptions about managerial behaviour provide 
LPSRUWDQWEXLOGLQJEORFNVIRU&KDQGOHU¶VPRGHO 
 These parallel theoretical developments have evolved along with 
&KDQGOHU¶VRZQZULWLQJVZLWKWKHFRQVHTXHQFHWKDWKLVPRGHOKDVEHFRPHILUPO\
embedded in the wider institutional and transaction cost economics literature. In 
addition to the conventional economic category of economies of scale, building 
on these literatures, Chandler (1990, pp.17-18, ff.2-3) adds economies of joint 
production and distribution, economies of scope, (Coase, 1937, Teece, 1980, 
Willig, 1981, Bailey and Friedlaender, 1982) and transaction cost economies 
(Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1981). By the same token, Williamson (1981) 
acknowledges the work of Chandler, which he develops to provide an economic, 
transaction-cost explanation of inter alia the rise of the multi-divisional firm. 
 Whilst relying upon and assimilating with WKHVH OLWHUDWXUHV &KDQGOHU¶V
emphasis differs in some important respects. Chandler (1990) stresses the 
active role of entrepreneurs in creating first mover competitive advantage, by 
making investments in plants of sufficient size to realise scale and scope 
economies. In contrast, institutional theories of the firm in tend to offer more 
deterministic explanations of firm behaviour, in the form of isomorphism 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), evolution and routine (Nelson and Winter, 1982) 
and population ecology models of the firm and industry life cycle (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1989). Theories that contain behavioural dimensions assume negative 
attributes such as shirking (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and opportunism 
:LOOLDPVRQRUSDVVLYLW\&\HUWDQG0DUFK&KDQGOHU¶VSRVLWLYHDQG
active view of corporate leadership is manifest only in restricted branches of 
organisational economics. Most prominent of these is the resource based view 
(RBV) of the firm. In the RBV, it is the possession of unique, or difficult to 
replicate, resources, including managerial talent and leadership that create 
competitive advantage and access to superior profits. In this sense, the RBV has 
EHHQFRQVWUXFWHGLQSDUWRQ&KDQGOHU¶VSLRQHHULQJZRUN 
 
Critique 
 4 
In common with much of institutional economics, Chandler presents us with an 
organisation that is efficient by virtue of cost minimisation. Whilst offering a 
useful alternative to the branch of economics that relies on profit maximisation, 
it offers no commensurate theory of value. In this sense it is incomplete as a 
theory of the firm. For example consider a firm making a Chandlerian investment 
in large scale plant with the objective of securing first mover competitive 
advantage. There is no theoretically consistent discount rate that can be using to 
appraise such investments, because such rates are derived from equilibrium 
based models of capital market behaviour that assume rational maximising 
EHKDYLRXU,IWKHPDQDJHUXVHVDGLVFRXQWUDWHWKDWLVUHJDUGHGDVµVDWLVIDFWRU\¶
by the manager but sub-RSWLPXPE\WKHFDSLWDOPDUNHWWKHYDOXHRIWKHILUP¶V
assets will nonetheless be downgraded by the market. As a consequence, the 
manager will face the threat of removal from the operation of the market for 
corporate control. A similar result arises from the information asymmetry 
inherent in corporate investment decisions of this character. The manager can 
counter the risk of devaluation from these two sources by applying the market 
discount rate, in other words, becoming a shareholder value maximiser, and by 
supplying more complete information to market monitors. Chandler (1977) 
acknowledges that under such circumstances managerial control is partially 
relinquished and is replaced by finance capitalism. As Wu (1989, p.11) puts it, 
capital market imperfections create an entrepreneurial role for capitalists, but as 
capital markets become more developed, financiers shed their entrepreneurial 
role and entrepreneurs shed their financing function in favour of corresponding 
groups of professional managers. Chandler does not however enter into a 
discussion of these theoretical trade-offs. 
 A further problem arising from the absence of a Chandlerian theory of 
value is how to price the assets that give rise to first mover competitive 
advantage assets. In essence, this is the same as the problem of heterogeneous 
asset valuation that has remained unresolved in the wider field of economics 
since the close of the Cambridge controversies in the early 1980s (Cohen and 
Harcourt, 2003).1 Conventionally, the asset value is the present value of the 
future cash flows it is likely to generate, presupposing a discount rate and 
therefore a rate of profit. However in the case of a first mover competitive 
advantage asset, as in neo-classical economics, the rate of profit follows from 
the possession of valuable assets.  
 There are though specific additional problems for the Chanderian model. 
First, the firm is a managerially controlled non-maximiser, so higher rates of 
profit relative to other firms are not its objective, and cannot be used to infer 
competitive advantage. Second, even if the firm is an efficient cost minimiser, 
the benefits of minimisation are unobservable. If the cheaper firm controls some 
but not all of the market, the price of output is regulated by the less efficient 
firm that can nonetheless satisfy some of the demand. The difference will 
constitute a rent for the more efficient firm. Because the firm is managerially 
controlled the rent may be absorbed by higher executive salaries or in 
managerial perquisites, which can manifest themselves as organisational slack. 
If the rent is absorbed in such fashion, in monetary terms the efficiency from 
lower cost production is exactly counterbalanced by the generation of 
                                                 
1  For a recent analysis of the problem of heterogeneous assets valuation see 
Toms (2010). 
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managerial rents. Of course the rent can be used to fund further investment in 
productive capacity, such that the firm can capture a greater share of the 
market. The realisation of monopoly places an upward limit on this process, 
creating greater incentive for diversification. However, because the portfolio 
investor can diversify at lower transaction cost, the cost minimisation rationale 
for diversification can no longer apply.2 In summary, even if efficiencies arising 
from investment in scale and scope economies can be generated, there are 
trade-off allocative efficiency problems in the absence of an efficient capital 
market.  
 So whilst economies of scale and scope have an obvious influence on 
organisational form and business strategy, they cannot by themselves account 
IRU JHQHUDO FDWHJRULHV VXFK DV µSHUVRQDO¶ DQG µPDQDJHULDO¶ FDSLWDOLVP The 
processes of allocating and distributing resources must also be considered.  
Notwithstanding the title of his 1990 work, Scale and Scope, all the economies of 
scale and scope referred to are internal, and external economies of scale and 
scope are only directly dealt with insofar as the distribution system is controlled 
by the firm to reduce associated unit and joint costs. Other external economies 
of scope are left out of the analysis, notwithstanding their potential importance 
for the understanding of economic performance and competitive advantage. 
These include district or local level economies associated with physical 
infrastructure, access to services, or pools of knowledge and expertise that lie 
outside the direct control of individual firms, as originally described by Alfred 
Marshall (Kamien et al, 1992, Oughton & Whittam, 1997). Clustering of firms in 
industrial districts, trade associations and other networked organisations are 
promoted through sharing trade secrets and drawing on local pools of experience 
and skilled labour. Such economies are of course important in regions and 
industries where the Chandlerian model appears to be less applicable, for 
example the successful Lancashire textile industry of the nineteenth century 
(Toms, 1998), the networked craft industries of Italy (Rinaldi, 2005), and the 
knowledge driven industries of Silicon Valley (Lecuyer, 2001).  
 The fragmentation of the computer industry in recent decades is a good 
illustration of how specialisation in certain periods of history and stages of 
economic development promotes flexibility, potentially replacing standardisation 
and scale economies (Piore & Sabel, 1984). Flexible specialisation does not 
however, presuppose small scale; indeed the computer industry, in the US at 
least, continues to sustain very large firms. Rather, competitive advantage 
comes from the fluidity of the boundaries of the firm (Zeitlin, 2008, p.129). As a 
result the co-ordinating mechanism is adjusted quickly according to 
circumstance, for example from market to hybrid (sub-contract, franchise, lease 
etc) to hierarchy and back again. Managerial structure accordingly plays a 
reduced role and its importance varies through time.  
 By emphasising managerial structure as the key mechanism for unlocking 
productivity, Chandler also neglects institutional factors that might promote 
managerial hierarchy or limit its scope for strategic action. As the literature on 
varieties of capitalism suggests (Whitley, 1994), the ownership of businesses 
                                                 
2 Exceptions to this rule, notably external economies of scale and under-utilised 
capacity, are analysed by Teece (1980). Chandler (1962 ± see p.453, ff.1) also 
points out that excess capacity arising from indivisible assets leads to 
diversification. 
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and their capital structure are a function of the configuration of financial 
institutions and can be very important as constraints or enablers of managerial 
activity.  
 The pattern of corporate development in the face of these changes in 
LQVWLWXWLRQDO VWUXFWXUHV SUHVHQWV D VWURQJ HPSLULFDO FKDOOHQJH WR &KDQGOHU¶V
model. That challenge has been responded to most notably in the field of 
EXVLQHVV KLVWRU\ ZKHUH &KDQGOHU¶V LQIOXHQFH FRQWLQXHV WR EH VWURQJO\ IHOW
Indeed, the Chandlerian thesis remains a widely accepted view of British 
business history (Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986). Empirical surveys have 
documented the extent of the diffusion of the M-form model, in Britain 
(Channon, 1973, Toms and Wright, 2002, Toms and Wilson, 2003), and France 
and Germany (Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976), and in all three countries. The latter 
evidence suggests that M-form adoption has indeed been widespread amongst 
the very large firms at least (Whittington and Mayer, 2000), but that there is a 
parallel and increasing trend of sell-offs, buy-outs and parent to parent sales of 
subsidiaries (Toms and Wright, 2003).   
 A further empirical test of the Chandler hypothesis is its prediction of 
British relative economic decline as a consequence of failure to adopt the 
efficiency features of the American model. For Chandler (1990) and Elbaum and 
Lazonick (1986) it was the absence of the large firm that undermined economic 
competitiveness. Again, this notion has been subjected to considerable empirical 
scrutiny by business historians. Whereas the Chandler hypothesis has remained 
influential in the US, British business historians have stressed the vibrancy of 
alternative forms of business organisation (Lamoreaux, Raff and Temin, 2008, 
p.44), including family businesses (Church, 1993, Jones and Rose, 1993), 
smaller and non-integrated firms. Others have argued that large firms have 
always been a feature of the British economy (Wardley, 1999), and that these 
were controlled by dispersed shareholders in contrast to the family groups that 
dominated US big business (Hannah, 2007). Because the Chandler model most 
obviously applies to manufacturing, and most would concede that British 
manufacturing has declined post 1945 (Matthews, 2007), other historians have 
pointed to the relative success of other sectors, particularly services and 
financial services over the longer run (Rubinstein, 1993), and pointed out that 
where success has been achieved, it has been more a function of market 
competition than managerial hierarchy (Broadberry and Crafts, 2001). 
 As suggested in the theoretical critique above, the rationale for 
Chandlerian firm, with its managerially determined objective function, depends 
to a certain extent on the absence of capital market scrutiny. Hence, the state of 
development of the capital market is likely to mediate the observed 
organisational form. Although Chandler highlights the importance of dividends in 
limiting capital accumulation in family businesses as part of his critique of British 
personal capitalism, he has little to say about capital markets and corporate 
governance. If capital markets were to become more efficient at scrutinising the 
actions of managers, then the Chandlerian firm might be expected to become 
less prominent.  
 Such a proposition can be subjected to empirical scrutiny. For example 
the absence or presence of a market for corporate control might have an 
important impact on the motivation and character of diversification. Similarly the 
presence or absence of liquid capital markets and legal rules on creditor and 
minority protection, accounting disclosure and insider trading might constitute 
further examples of market, governance and regulatory influences on corporate 
strategy and structure. Indeed these aspects appear to have become more 
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important in recent decades and many key developments have followed the high 
water mark of the large Chandlerian organisation of the 1980s. Since then the 
steady growth of the managerial firm and its associated hierarchy has been 
supplanted by waves of divestment and delayering in Britain (Toms and Wright, 
DQGWKH867RPVDQG:ULJKW&KDQGOHU¶VPRGHOKDVQRW\HWEHHQ
adapted to the wave of downsizing and sell offs that has transformed M-form US 
businesses into newer structures befitting the later twentieth century, including 
networks, joint ventures, multi-layered subsidiary organisations (Prechel, 2000, 
Toms and Wright, 2005, Zey and Swenson, 2001). According to these authors, 
corporate restructuring away from the M-Form model has been a consequence in 
substantial part of the liberalisation and greater transparency of financial 
markets. 
 As this brief review of empirical evidence suggests, the Chandlerian model 
lacks universal appeal because, as Whittington and Mayer suggest (2000, p.10), 
WKHUHLVDQHHGWRDFFRPPRGDWHERWKµWHUULWRU\± national cultures and national 
LQVWLWXWLRQV¶ DVZHOO DV µWKH FRQVWDQW HEEDQG IORZRI SRZHURU IDVKLRQ¶ LQ RXU
understanding of business evolution. From a historical point of view, the more 
the institutional environments of other countries and periods beyond the first 
KDOI RI WKH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ DUH FRQVLGHUHG WKH OHVV VXVWDLQDEOH &KDQGOHU¶V
model becomes. Similarly, there is no provision for the political power of big 
business in explaining the success of corporate America. Nonetheless, as a 
model designed to explain an important episode in US corporate history, 
&KDQGOHU¶VPRGHOQRQHWKHOHVVKDVenduring appeal. 
 
Can the Chandler model be developed? 
$VWKHFULWLTXHDERYHKDVVXJJHVWHG&KDQGOHU¶VZRUNPLJKWEHGHYHORSHGE\DQ
engagement with capital market and valuation theory. At first sight this is a 
contradictory project, since managers and capital markets are concerned with 
maximising different things, or as we have seen, in the case of managerial 
KLHUDUFKLHV DYRLGLQJ PD[LPLVDWLRQ DOWRJHWKHU +RZHYHU &KDQGOHU¶V SDUDGLJP
and capital market theory both operate with and accommodate transaction 
costs, in the latter case for example information costs, where outside investors 
cannot monitor managerial insiders without incurring costs. At the same time, 
managerial insiders face resource dependency vis a vis the capital market, 
creating incentives to share information at certain stages of the product life 
cycle. Meanwhile, capital markets undergo institutionally determined changes in 
their ability to monitor resource use by managerial groups, and hence the 
transaction based monitoring cost involved. So whereas the Chandlerian firm 
minimises internal transaction costs, for example by using an internal capital 
market in an M-Form structure, there is no reason why the minimisation of all 
transaction costs, including in the governance aspects of the organisation, 
should not be accommodated into the model. Organisational evolution then 
becomes a function of the relative importance of internal and external 
transaction cost, according to the conditions of economic development. Such a 
synthesis also offers the opportunity to build upon the seminal empirical work of 
Chandler, adding dimensions of corporate governance and accountability to 
explain the long run evolution of business organisations (Toms and Wilson, 
2003). 
 
Conclusions 
&KDQGOHU¶V ZRUN IRUPV SDUW RI D significant literature of managerial economics 
going back to the 1930s and the contemporaneous writing of Edith Penrose. For 
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WKH UHDVRQV GLVFXVVHG DERYH &KDQGOHU¶V LPSRUWDQFH VWUHWFKHV EH\RQG
managerial economics and the theory of the firm, and has been influential in the 
strategy3 and management literature for similar reasons, and a dominant figure 
in business and economic history. 7KHUHDUHVWUDQGVRI&KDQGOHU¶VLQIOXHQFHLQDOO
these areas that are of consequence for the theory of the firm, and this chapter 
has endeavoured to extract and summarise the most important and relevant 
DVSHFWV$VD FRQVHTXHQFHRI VXFKDQHQJDJHPHQWZLWK&KDQGOHU¶VZULWLQJVD
deeper understanding of the growth and development of the large scale 
corporate organisation can be acquired. ,Q WKLV VHQVH &KDQGOHU¶V HPSLULFDO
contribution is as important as his theoretical contribution. As Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1993, p.25) concluded, the theory of the firm ought to be developed 
DFFRUGLQJWR&KDQGOHU¶VSVXJJHVWLRQ µIURPWKHpoint of view of busy 
PHQUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWKHGHVWLQ\RIWKHHQWHUSULVH¶UDWKHUWKDQGHGXFHGIURPWKH
premises of social scientists.  
 That said, as the above discussion has shown, the Chandler model has 
theoretical shortcomings that prevent it operating as a fully integrated theory of 
the firm. At the same time, its universalising predictions are not always 
supported by empirical evidence. Even so, according to some, the large 
Chandlerian firm is of continuing importance and is developing in line with the 
global economy (Cassis, 2008). Meanwhile, the experience of managerial 
delayering, outsourcing and downsizing has shown that the large corporation is 
vulnerable to market pressures and capital market scrutiny. Where managers 
champion shareholder value, it is clear that to some extent they have lost sight 
of the managerially determined objectives of investment in scale and scope 
economies. If Chandler offers a view of productive efficiency, it needs to be 
reconciled with the question of allocative efficiency. In other words, for the 
economist, the crucial contingent questions remain: what is the optimum 
number of firms in a market and what is the optimum level of competition? 
&KDQGOHU¶V DQDO\VLV SRVHV WKHVH TXHVWLRQV UDWKHU WKDQ UHVROYLQJ WKHP ,Q WKDW
sense, his theory of the firm remains to be developed.  
                                                 
3 &KDQGOHU LV FUHGLWHG ZLWK EULQJLQJ WKH ZRUG µVWUDWHJ\¶ LQWR WKH EXVLQHVV
YRFDEXODU\UHSODFLQJWKHUDWKHUDQWLTXDWHGµEXVLQHVVSROLF\¶DVZHOODVRIIHULQJ
a definition of the term that has stood the test of time (Whittington 2008; 267).  
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